We generalize the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model of the international organization of production in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In particular, we allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. A continuum of …rms with heterogeneous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource the production of intermediate inputs, and from which country to source them. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationship-speci…c investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated …rm and in an arm's-length relationship. We describe equilibria in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels choose di¤erent ownership structures and supplier locations, and then study the e¤ects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. Better contracting institutions in the South raise the prevalence of o¤shoring, but may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI or foreign outsourcing. The impact on the composition of o¤shoring depends on whether the institutional improvement a¤ects disproportionately the contractibility of a particular input. A key message of the paper is that improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by …nal-good producers have di¤erent e¤ects than improvements in the contractibility of inputs controlled by suppliers.
Introduction
Insights from neoclassical trade theory and new trade theory have improved our understanding of the structure of foreign trade and investment. Recent developments in the world economy have sparked, however, an increased interest in new theoretical approaches designed to better understand the evidence about …rms that organize production on a global scale. These developments include the growing role of multinational corporations in the global economy, 1 their engagement in more complex integration strategies, 2 and the growing share of intermediate inputs in trade ‡ows. 3 Although traditional theories allow for trade in intermediate inputs and for the emergence of international production networks, 4 they cannot explain some newly observed phenomena. 5 First, while the traditional approaches assume that …rms are (for the most part) symmetrically structured within industries, the data exhibit substantial within-industry heterogeneity, both in the size distribution of …rms and in their participation in foreign trade. 6 Second, in developing global sourcing strategies …rms decide on where to locate the production of di¤erent parts of their value chains and also on the extent of their control over these activities. Which activities should they locate in the home country and which should they o¤shore? If they choose to o¤shore, should they engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and import intermediate inputs within their boundaries or should they outsource the production of intermediates to independent foreign suppliers? As is well known from the work of Coase (1937) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , and Grossman and Hart (1986) , these questions cannot be answered in a complete-contracting framework of the type used in traditional theories of international trade.
In Antràs and Helpman (2004) we developed a simple two-country Ricardian model of international trade in order to address some of these issues. In our model, …rms in the North develop di¤erentiated products. Then they decide whether to integrate the production of intermediates or outsource them. In either case …rms have to decide in which country to source these inputs, in the high-cost North or the low-cost South. Production entails relationship-speci…c investments by both the …nal-good producers (or product developers) and their suppliers, and we assumed that the nature of these investments does not enable the parties to specify them in an enforceable contract. As in the work of Grossman and Hart (1986) , we envisioned a world in which incomplete contracting creates ine¢ ciencies even when the production of intermediate inputs is carried out by integrated suppliers. The key di¤erence between integration and outsourcing is that only the former gives the …nal-good producer property rights over the fruits of the relationship-speci…c investments.
Our model focused on the choices between integration and outsourcing and between domestic sourcing and foreign sourcing. In particular, we described an equilibrium in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels choose among the four feasible organizational modes: domestic outsourcing, domestic integration, foreign outsourcing (and thus imports of intermediate inputs at arm's length), and foreign integration (and thus FDI and intra…rm imports of inputs). We then studied the e¤ects of variations in country and industry characteristics on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms.
In this paper we generalize the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. 7 In particular, we adopt the formulation of partial contracting from Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) . Final-good producers and their suppliers undertake a continuum of relationship-speci…c activities aimed at producing an intermediate input used in the production of the …nal good. A fraction of these activities is ex-ante contractible while the rest cannot be veri…ed by a court of law and therefore are noncontractible. Both parties are bound to perform their duties in the contractible activities, but they are free to choose how much they invest in the noncontractible activities. Moreover, a party can withhold its noncontractible services at the bargaining stage over the division of surplus if it is not satis…ed with the outcome. Every party's expected payo¤ in the bargaining game determines its willingness to invest in the noncontractible activities. Suppliers of intermediate inputs do not expect to receive the full marginal return from their investment in noncontractible activities, and therefore tend to underinvest in these activities relative to a complete-contracting benchmark. The larger the fraction of noncontractible activities is, the larger the distortions in production are.
We allow the degree of contractibility to vary across inputs and countries. 8 As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) , we describe equilibria in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels choose di¤erent ownership structures and supplier locations. We then study the e¤ects of changes in the quality of contracting institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms.
We begin the analysis with a closed economy in which an organizational choice boils down to outsourcing versus integration. We show that, as in our previous work, the relative importance of the inputs provided by di¤erent parties is a crucial determinant of the "make-or-buy"decision. 9 In particular, regardless of the degree of contractibility of the inputs, integration is pro…t-maximizing if and only if the production process is su¢ ciently intensive in the input provided by the …nal-good producer. The new interesting result is that the degree of contractibility of di¤erent inputs plays a central role in the integration decision. Improvements in the contractibility of an input provided by the …nal-good producer encourage outsourcing while improvements in the contractibility of 7 Using data on the activities of U.S. multinational …rms, Yeaple (2006) presents evidence supporting some salient cross-industry implications of our model. In particular, he …nds that the share of intra…rm imports in total U.S. imports (a measure of the relative prevalence of FDI over foreign outsourcing) is higher in industries with high R&D intensity and high productivity dispersion. Although the generalized model developed in this paper also implies a positive correlation between the share of intra…rm trade and productivity dispersion, it implies a more nuanced correlation with R&D intensity.
8 But we maintain the standard assumption that the set of available contracts does not vary with …rm boundaries. 9 See also Grossman and Hart (1986) and Antràs (2003 Antràs ( , 2005 .
an input provided by a supplier encourage integration. This contrasts with the transaction-costs literature (e.g., Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 1985 , where any type of contractual improvement tends to favor outsourcing.
We next extend the analysis to a two-country world in which …nal-good producers can contract with suppliers in their home country, North, or a foreign country, South. Wages are higher in
North, but North has better contracting institutions in the sense that larger fractions of activities are contractible in North. Although …nal-good producers always locate in North and make their investments there, we allow the contractibility of these investments to be a function of the location of suppliers. This re ‡ects the notion that certain clauses of a contract may be harder to enforce when the contract governs an international transaction or when one of the parties resides in a country with weaker contracting institutions.
Having constructed equilibria in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels sort into di¤erent organizational forms, we proceed to study the e¤ects of improvements in contractibility on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. We …rst derive the result that improvements in contractibility in South raise the share of Northern …rms that o¤shore the production of intermediate inputs.
In contrast, improvements in contractibility in North reduce the share of o¤shoring …rms.
These results are in line with recent arguments that the quality of contracting institutions impacts comparative advantage (see Helpman (2006) for a summary); the work of Nunn (2006) provides empirical support. 10 We also show, however, that the e¤ect that changes in contractibility have on the relative prevalence of particular organizational forms depends importantly on the nature of the contractual improvements. In particular, better contracting in South, which raises o¤shoring, may reduce the relative prevalence of FDI if the institutional improvement a¤ects disproportionately the contractibility of inputs provided by the …nal-good producer. And better contractibility in South may reduce the share of …rms engaged in o¤shore outsourcing when the contractual improvements are biased toward inputs provided by suppliers rather than the …nal-good producer. One has to be mindful of the impact that improvements in legal systems have on the contractibility of speci…c inputs when predicting the prevalence of particular organizational forms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model of the …rm in the presence of partial contracting. Section 3 studies the make-or-buy decision in a closed economy.
Section 4 extends the analysis to a two-country world. Section 5 concludes.
Technology and Investment
In this section we generalize the model of the …rm that we developed in Antràs and Helpman (2004) in order to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. For this purpose we …rst focus on a single …rm that produces a brand of a di¤erentiated product, for which it faces a demand function q = Ap
where q is quantity, p is price, A measures the demand level, and is a parameter that controls the demand elasticity; the larger is the larger the elasticity of demand 1= (1 ) is. As is well known, this form of demand results from constant elasticity-of-substitution preferences for brands of a di¤erentiated product. This demand function yields revenue
Output q is produced with two inputs, headquarter services X h and an intermediate input X m , using a Cobb-Douglas production function
where represents productivity, which may vary across …rms, and h is a parameter that measures the technology's headquarter intensity. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) , both inputs are brandspeci…c. That is, X h and X m have to be designed to precisely …t the needs of this brand; otherwise the services derived from the inputs equal zero. Moreover, an input designed to …t this brand cannot be usefully employed in the production of other brands of the product.
We follow Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2006) in assuming that each one of the specialized inputs is produced with a set of activities indexed by points on the interval [0; 1], according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
where x j (i) is the investment in activity i for input j. Investment in activities is input-speci…c:
they can be used only to produce the input for which they were designed. We assume that activities connected with input j in the range 0; j , 0 j 1, j = h; m, are contractible, in the sense that the characteristics of these activities can be fully speci…ed in advance in an enforceable ex-ante contract. The remaining activities ( j ; 1] are not contractible.
The …nal-good producer has to supply headquarter services and she has to hire a supplier for the intermediate input. The supplier of X m can be the …rm's employee or an outside agent. At this point we put aside the question of whether the …rm integrates the production of the intermediate input or outsources it; we will deal with this question later. For now note that in either case there is an agency problem, because by assumption the …rm needs a supplier. The organizational form determines (i) …xed costs, to be speci…ed later; (ii) variable costs of investment c j per unit x j (i) for j = h; m and i 2 [0; 1], where c h is borne by the …nal-good producer while c m is borne by the supplier; (iii) the fractions of contractible activities j , j = h; m; and (iv) the fraction h 2 (0; 1) of the revenue that the …nal-good producer obtains at the bargaining stage, and the fraction m = 1 h of the revenue that the supplier of X m obtains. We will discuss the details of alternative organizational forms in due course.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The …nal-good producer enters the industry and …nds out her productivity level .
2. The …nal-good producer chooses to leave the industry or stay and produce.
3. If she chooses to stay, the …nal-good producer chooses an organizational form.
4. The …nal-good producer commits to invest fx hc (i)g 6. The supplier and the …nal-good producer simultaneously choose their investment levels x j (i) = x jc (i) in the contractible activities i 2 0; j , j = h; m, as speci…ed in the contract, and both sides choose independently their remaining investment levels x mj (i), i 2 ( m ; 1], j = h; m; in the noncontractible activities.
Output
is sold and the resulting revenue is distributed between the …nal-good producer and the supplier in proportions h and m , respectively. (We will discuss the details of the bargaining later on.)
We seek to characterize a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of this 7-stage game.
To characterize an SSPE of this game …rst consider stage 6, in which the …nal-good producer and the supplier each choose their investment levels in the noncontractible activities. Using the revenue function (1), the …nal-good producer's problem is
subject to equation (2), x j (i) = x jc (i) for the contractible activities, and given investment levels x m (i) in the supplier's noncontractible activities. Similarly, the supplier's problem is
subject to equation (2), x j (i) = x jc (i) for the contractible activities, and given investment levels x h (i) in the …rm's noncontractible activities. The Nash equilibrium of this noncooperative game yields
for the noncontractible activities. It follows that the investment in noncontractible activities is
where !`= `( 1 `) for`= h; m; and ! = P`= h;m !`. Note that ! h measures the importance of the noncontractible activities of headquarter services in the production of the …nal good; it represents the elasticity of output with respect to x hn . Similarly, ! m measures the importance of the noncontractible activities of the intermediate input in the production of the …nal good; it represents the elasticity of output with respect to x mn . These measures of the impact of the noncontractible activities on the production of the …nal good play an important role in our applications of the model. For stage 5 of the game to generate a non-empty set of applicants for the supply of X m the …nal-good producer needs to o¤er a contract that satis…es the suppliers'participation constraint, which is
where the left-hand side represents a supplier's payo¤ from forming a relationship with the …nal-good producer and the right-hand side represents his outside option before he forms this relationship. In this participation constraint the investment levels in the noncontractible activities satisfy equation (4); the investment levels in the contractible activities are x jc (i) for i 2 0; j , j = h; m, as speci…ed in the contract; and revenue R and output q are given by (1) and (2), respectively.
In stage 3 the …nal-good producer chooses the contract to maximize her payo¤
subject to (1), (2), the participation constraint (5), and the incentive compatibility constraints (4).
As long as there are no constraints on the upfront payment m , the participation constraint is satis…ed with equality at the solution to this problem. Therefore we can solve the upfront payment m from the participation constraint treated as an equality and substitute the result into the …nal-good producer's objective function. Under these circumstances the …nal-good producer's choice of contractible investments is the solution to
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and the revenue and output equations (1) and (2). The solutions of x j (i) for i 2 0; j , j = h; m, yield the contractible investment levels x jc (i) for i 2 0; j , j = h; m. Using the …rst-order conditions of the maximization problem together with (3) they can be expressed as
Comparing this equation with (3) we obtain: 11
Lemma 1 For every input j = h; m; investment in contractible activities is larger than investment in noncontractible activities, i.e., x jc > x jn ; for j = h; m.
Evidently, when investment in contractible activities exceeds investment in noncontractible activities the investment levels do not maximize overall pro…ts, because the two types of investment are equally costly. Moreover, the relative investment levels in the contractible activities, x hc =x mc = ( h =c h ) = ( m =c m ), are pro…t maximizing, while the relative investment levels in the noncontractible
, are not. The latter results from the fact that each party's return on its investment in noncontractible activities depends on its bargaining share j , and these shares are not necessarily equal. If they are equal, there is no distortion in the relative investment in noncontractible activities. Finally, note that the optimal investment levels for a pro…t-maximizing …rm are x j (i) = j =c j R for j = h; m. Therefore in the equilibrium the noncontractible activities are underinvested and the contractible activities are overinvested relative to the revenue level R.
This characterization of the contractible investment levels yields
; for j; k = h; m and k 6 = j;
where This implies that the …nal-good producer's pro…ts are
is an alternative measure of productivity, and
is a derived parameter which is proportional to the demand level; it depends on the costs of inputs, on the bargaining shares, and on the importance of contractual frictions for headquarter services and intermediate inputs. As expected, the pro…ts of the …nal-good producer are higher the higher the demand level A is, the lower the costs of inputs c h and c m are, and the less attractive the suppliers' outside option w m is. In addition, her pro…ts are lower the larger ! h or ! m is, which implies that her pro…ts are higher the larger the fraction of contractible activities in headquarter services and/or in intermediate inputs is. These results are summarized in 12
Proposition 1 The pro…ts of the …nal-good producer are decreasing in input costs c j , j = h; m, declining in the outside option of suppliers, w m , and increasing in the shares of contractible activities
Bearing in mind that m = 1 h , note that pro…ts are not monotonic in h , rather they are smallest when the revenue share of the …nal-good producer equals zero or one, and pro…ts are higher for intermediate values. So consider the shares h and m that maximize pro…ts. To …nd them, we maximize
subject to the constraint h = 1 m , and h 2 (0; 1). The solution to this problem is unique; it is given by
and it implies that ( h m ) (! h ! m ) 0, with strict inequality holding when ! h 6 = ! m . That is, the …nal-good producer wants to give the supplier less than half the revenue if and only if the noncontractible activities in m are less important than the noncontractible activities in h.
Moreover, j is increasing in ! j and declining in ! k , k 6 = j, and h = m = 1=2 for ! h = ! m . In other words, the …nal-good producer wants to give the supplier lower shares of the revenue the less important noncontractible activities in m are and the more important noncontractible activities in 1 2 For proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3, see the Appendix. , it also implies that the …nal-good producer's optimal h is increasing in h , declining in h ; and increasing in m . Finally, pro…ts are rising with j for 0 < j < j and declining with j for j < j < 1. These results are summarized in Proposition 2 The optimal shares h and m have the following properties:
(ii) h is increasing in h , declining in h ; and increasing in m .
(iii) Pro…ts are rising with j for 0 < j < j and declining with j for j < j < 1, j = h; m.
We will use these results in the following analysis. Now consider what determines the share h under outsourcing and integration. In stage 7 of the game the investment levels x h (i) and x m (i) are predetermined and therefore so are the input levels X h and X m of headquarter services and components. At this stage the supplier and the …nal-good producer bargain over the distribution of revenue R that they will receive when the …nal goods are sold in the market. Under outsourcing, X m belongs to the supplier, while X h belongs to the …nal-good producer. If the bargaining fails, output q equals zero and so does revenue.
Moreover, given the high speci…city of these inputs, which have no value outside the relationship, the outside option of every player equals zero. We assume that the parties engage in generalized Nash bargaining with a bargaining weight 2 (0; 1) for the …nal-good producer and 1 2 (0; 1)
for the supplier. Therefore the solution to the bargaining game, which gives every player his/her outside option plus the bargaining weight times the ex-post gains from the relationship, delivers the …nal-good producer the payo¤ 0 + (R 0 0) = R . Namely, it gives her the fraction of the revenue. By similar reasoning the supplier gets (1 ) R. It follows from this analysis that under outsourcing the …nal-good producer gets the fraction hO = of the revenue, while the supplier gets the fraction mO = 1 .
Next consider integration. Under this arrangement the supplier is the …nal-good producer's employee and therefore the supplier does not own the intermediate input. As a result the outside option of the supplier equals zero. Following Grossman and Hart (1986) , we assume that in the absence of the supplier's cooperation the …nal-good producer, who owns both X h and X m , cannot produce as e¢ ciently with these inputs on her own as she can with the cooperation of the supplier.
In particular, we assume that the …nal-good producer can produce on her own only a fraction 2 (0; 1) of the output that she can produce with the cooperation of the supplier, i.e., q instead of q, where q is given in (2). In these circumstances the revenue is R instead of R, where R = A 1 q is the revenue generated by q (see (1)). It follows that now the outside option of the …nal-good producer is not zero but R, and this outside option is smaller the larger is the e¢ ciency loss from the departure of the supplier. As a result, the …nal-good producer's payo¤ from bargaining is R + (R R 0) = hV R, where
is the share of the revenue accruing to the …nal-good producer. The supplier obtains the revenue share mV = 1 hV . Evidently, hV > = hO , which means that the …nal-good producer gets a larger share of the revenue under integration than under outsourcing. In what follows, our analysis proceeds under the assumption that hV > hO . Figure 1 depicts the revenue shares hO and hV and the headquarter intensities hL and hH for which each one of these shares maximizes pro…ts. Part (iii) of Proposition 2 implies that all …rms with intensity below hL prefer to outsource and all …rms with intensity above hH prefer to integrate. By continuity, …rms with intensity slightly above hL also prefer to outsource and …rms with intensity slightly below hH also prefer to integrate. And we show in the Appendix that a unique critical intensity level exists between hL and hH , denoted in the …gure by hc , at which a …rm is just indi¤erent between outsourcing and integration. Firms with headquarter intensity below hc outsource and those with intensity above hc integrate. 14 This result is similar to our result in Antràs and Helpman (2004) .
In order to study the impact of the quality of legal systems on industrial structure we need to understand how contractual frictions a¤ect the make-or-buy decision. To this end …rst consider an improvement in contracting for intermediate inputs, re ‡ected in an increase in m , the fraction of contractible activities in the manufacturing of components. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that this raises the optimal revenue share h . In Figure 1 this translates into an upward shift of the h curve. As a result, the critical intensity levels hL and hH decline. We show in the Appendix that the critical intensity level hc also declines. 15 The implication is that in response to improvements in contracting possibilities for components, more …rms, i.e., …rms with a larger range of headquarter intensities, choose to integrate. The reason is that with better contracting in intermediate inputs,
…nal-good producers are less dependent on the power of the incentives they can o¤er suppliers, and for this reason outsourcing -which gives the suppliers stronger incentives than integrationbecomes less attractive. Importantly, the opposite happens when contracting improves in headquarter services. In this case part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies that the optimal revenue share h declines for every …rm and the cuto¤ hc rises. 16 As a result …rms with a larger range of headquarter intensities choose outsourcing over integration. The reason is that with better contracting in headquarter services it becomes more important to give suppliers better incentives, because contractual frictions now play a relatively more important role in components. In response more …rms choose outsourcing, which gives the suppliers more powerful incentives.
These results are summarized in the following:
Proposition 3 Let …xed and variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing. Then: (i) There exists a unique headquarter-intensity cuto¤ hc 2 (0; 1) such that pro…ts are higher under outsourcing for h < hc and higher under integration for h > hc .
(ii) The cuto¤ hc is higher the larger h is and the smaller m is.
This proposition implies that whenever sectors di¤er by headquarter intensity and organizational choices do not a¤ect …xed and variable costs, the make-or-buy decision does not depend on a …rm's productivity, only on its sectoral a¢ liation. All …rms in low headquarter intensity sectors choose outsourcing and all …rms in high headquarter intensity sectors choose integration. Moreover, the fraction of sectors that choose integration is larger the larger is the fraction of contractible activities in components and the smaller is the fraction of contractible activities in headquarter services.
We next examine the impact of …xed costs on the make-or-buy decision of …rms with di¤erent productivity levels. To this end suppose that there are di¤erent …xed costs of running an integrated or an outsourcing enterprise, which we denote by F V and F O , respectively. Under these circumstances we can replace the pro…t function (8) with
where i represents the organizational form, and Z i is the derived parameter Z when evaluated at h = hi and the industry's h . At this point we take variable costs c h and c m to be the same for both organizational forms, and therefore for a given industry, Z i varies only with hi . Proposition
Following Antràs and Helpman (2004) , we now assume that integration involves higher …xed costs than outsourcing. Two opposing forces determine these costs. On the one hand managerial overload is larger in an integrated enterprise, because management has to pay attention to many more tasks. On the other hand there are economies of scope in management. If the managerial overload imposes larger costs than the costs saved due to economies of scope then
For concreteness we assume F V > F O . Under the circumstances pro…ts from outsourcing are higher than pro…ts from integration in all sectors with h < hc , independently of a …rm's productivity level. The pro…t function O is depicted in Figure 2 ; it has an intercept at minus w m + F O and a constant slope Z O . The resulting pro…ts are negative for < . For this reason only …rms with higher productivity manufacture in this industry. We also depict in this …gure the pro…t function from integration, V ; it has a lower intercept because F V > F O and a lower slope because Z V < Z O . This shows that in industries with low headquarter intensity all pro…table …rms outsource. Figure 3 depicts the two pro…t functions O and V in a sector with high headquarter intensity. Now the …xed costs still give outsourcing an advantage, as they did in the low headquarter intensity sector. But this is partly o¤set by lower-power incentives to the supplier, which helps the …nal-good producer (i.e., Z V > Z O ). As a result, outsourcing dominates integration only for low-productivity …rms, those with < O . 17 It follows that …rms with productivity below do not produce, those Our results on the choice of organizational forms by …rms with di¤erent productivity levels are summarized in Proposition 4 Let variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing and let …xed costs be higher under integration. Then: (i) In every sector there exists a cuto¤ such that …rms with productivity below do not produce.
(ii) In a sector with h < hc ; all …rms with productivity above outsource.
(iii) In a sector with h > hc ; there exists a cuto¤ O such that all …rms with productivity above this cuto¤ integrate. If this cuto¤ is above , then all …rms in the productivity range ( ; O )
outsource.
This proposition shows how …xed-cost di¤erences between organizational forms interact with productivity di¤erences across …rms in shaping sectoral make-or-buy decisions. In economies with higher …xed costs of integration, high-productivity …rms integrate and low-productivity …rms outsource in sectors with high headquarter intensity. In sectors with low headquarter intensity all …rms outsource.
Now consider the impact of contractual frictions on the relative prevalence of integration and outsourcing. Evidently, this analysis applies only to sectors with h > hc , in which the two organizational forms coexist. As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) , we measure the prevalence of an organizational form by the fraction of …rms that adopt it.
For this purpose let the cumulative distribution function of productivity be G ( ). Then in sectors with O > the fraction of …rms that integrate is
Next suppose that is distributed Pareto with shape parameter , so that 18
Then
It follows that the share of integrating …rms is larger the larger the ratio = O is. From the de…nition of these cuto¤s we …nd that
can be below . In the latter case all pro…table …rms in the industry integrate. 1 8 There is a productivity distribution of , say G ( ), and this distribution induces a distribution of = =(1 ) , G ( ). When is distributed Pareto with the shape parameter k then is also distributed Pareto with the shape parameter = k = (1 ) :
Therefore V is larger the larger the ratio Z V =Z O is. We show in the Appendix that this ratio is decreasing in h and increasing in m . As a result, the share of outsourcing …rms, which equals 1 V , is increasing in h and declining in m . We therefore have
Proposition 5 Let variable costs be the same under integration and outsourcing and let …xed costs be higher under integration. Then in sectors with h > hc in which O > the share of outsourcing …rms is increasing in h and declining in m .
It follows from this proposition that larger contractual frictions in headquarter services encourage integration and larger contractual frictions in components encourage outsourcing. For this reason overall improvements in the quality of the legal system, which raise the fraction of contractible activities in both headquarter services and components, may raise the relative prevalence of integration or outsourcing. 19 A key insight from this proposition is that contractual improvements per se do not bias the industrial structure toward outsourcing, because the di¤erential impact of the improvement on contractual frictions in the two inputs plays an important role.
Note that Proposition 5 describes the impact of variations in contractual frictions on the prevalence of outsourcing even when there are general equilibrium e¤ects, as long as the general equilibrium feedbacks do no impact the relative cost ratio 
Foreign Sourcing
Next consider foreign sourcing. We assume that the …nal-good producer is located in North, which is a high-cost country. But North has good contracting institutions so the fraction of activities that are contractible is larger in North. Now a …rm is not required to source the intermediate 1 9 To clarify this point, let be an index of the quality of a country's legal system and let i ( ), i = O; V , be increasing functions of this index. Then the marginal e¤ects 0 i ( ), i.e., the slopes of these functions, can di¤er substantially. We have no theory to tell how they di¤er, and it is clear from our analysis that there are di¤erences that lead to a rise in the prevalence of outsourcing and other di¤erences that lead to a rise in the prevalence of integration. Moreover, the shift in industrial structure may depend on sectoral characteristics, such as headquarter intensity. We show in the Appendix an example with i ( ) = for i = O; V , in which the ratio ZV =ZO is rising in for h = 0:4 and declining in for h = 0:5, where both these h 's are above hc . 2 0 In our analysis we have assumed that FV > FO. Suppose instead that the …xed costs of outsourcing are higher than the …xed costs of integration. In this case we obtain the following results. First, in every sector there exists a cuto¤ such that …rms with productivity below do not produce. Second, in a sector with h > hc ; all …rms with productivity above integrate. Third, in a sector with h < hc there exists a cuto¤ V such that all …rms with productivity above this cuto¤ outsource, and if V > , then all …rms in the productivity range ( ; V ) integrate. Finally, in an industry in which some …rms integrate and some …rms outsource, we …nd that the share of outsourcing …rms is increasing in h and declining in m , just as in Proposition 5. Hence, the e¤ect of contractual frictions on the relative prevalence of integration or outsourcing is independent of the ranking of …xed costs. input in its home country; it has a choice to source it in North or South. Unlike North, South is a low-cost country, but its contracting institutions are weaker and therefore smaller fractions of activities are contractible there. In what follows we denote with the superscript N variables that are a¢ liated with North and superscript S variables that are a¢ liated with South. Our assumption can therefore be represented by N j > S j for j = h; m. In addition we assume that the …nal-good producer has to produce headquarter services in North, but she can produce intermediate inputs in North or South, with c S m < c N m . In either case, i.e., independently of whether she produces components in North or South, she has the option to do so in-house or to outsource. When she chooses integration in South she engages in foreign direct investment (FDI). When she chooses outsourcing in South she engages in an arm's-length transaction. In the former case there is intra…rm imports of components; in the latter case there is arm's-length imports of components.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the revenue shares hi , i = O; V , are the same in North and South. As a result we can characterize the relative size of the cuto¤ hc , which now depends on whether components are produced in North or South. The cuto¤ N hc is de…ned in the same way as before; it represents the headquarter intensity at which the …nal-good producer is indi¤erent between outsourcing and integration when the variable costs and …xed costs are the same in both cases, and the contractual frictions N j , j = h; m, are those prevailing in North. In other words, N hc solves Z N O = Z N V , where in computing these Zs we use equation (9) evaluated at Northern variable costs. We have shown in the appendix that the ratio Z N O =Z N V does not depend on the variable costs and that it declines in h . As a result the solution to N hc is unique. We now de…ne analogously S hc as the headquarter intensity measure at which Z S O = Z S V , where Z S i represents the derived parameter Z in equation (9) evaluated at the unit cost of headquarter services in North, c N h , the unit cost of components in South, c S m , the Southern measure of contractual friction for headquarter services, S h , and the Southern measure of contractual frictions for components, S m . Now too the cuto¤ S hc does not depend on unit costs and the ratio Z S O =Z S V is declining in h . As a result, the cuto¤ S hc is unique. The implication is that in industries with h < S hc we have Z S O > Z S V ; and in industries with h > S hc we have Z S O < Z S V . It then follows that among the …rms who choose to o¤shore the production of intermediate inputs, those with h < S hc prefer to outsource, and those with h > S hc prefer to integrate, unless the …xed costs of integration and outsourcing are not the same.
Note that the ratio
only as a result of the di¤erence between S j and N j for j = h; m. In the previous section (see Appendix for a formal proof), we have established that Z O =Z V is decreasing in m and increasing in h . As a result, the lower contractibility of components in South, S m < N m , tends to make the ratio Z S O =Z S V higher than the ratio Z N O =Z N V . On the other hand, our formulation implies that foreign sourcing also reduces the contractibility of headquarter services even though these are produced in North, S h < N h . The idea is that, as in Antràs (2005) , all parts of a contract governing an international transaction are relatively harder to enforce. The lower contractibility of headquarter services associated with o¤shoring tends to make m , the cuto¤ hc is higher when components are produced in South than when they are produced in North; that is, S hc > N hc .
This proposition implies that when weak institutions in South have a stronger e¤ect on the contractibility of components than headquarter services, then more sectors …nd outsourcing advantageous when they o¤shore than when they do not. 21 A direct corollary of this proposition is
h is su¢ ciently smaller than N m S m , the slopes of the pro…t functions satisfy:
We are now ready to characterize the joint o¤shoring and make-or-buy decisions. For this purpose we assume, as we did in the previous section, that the …xed costs of integration are higher than the …xed costs of outsourcing. Moreover, we assume that the …xed costs of o¤shoring are higher than the …xed costs of producing at home. In addition, we make the somewhat stronger assumption
In this ordering the …xed costs of doing business in South are substantially higher than the …xed costs of doing business in North, and this di¤erence overwhelms the South's cost advantage in w m .
The resulting pro…t functions are ì = Zì wm Fì , i = O; V; and`= N; S:
As in Antràs and Helpman (2004) it is now useful to study the equilibrium in sectors that di¤er by headquarter intensity, h .
Low Headquarter Intensity Sector
First consider an industry with headquarter intensity h smaller than N hc . From Corollary 1 this implies ZÒ > ZV for`= N; S. Given that the overall …xed costs of integration wm + FV are 2 1 Formally, the result follows from the fact that ZÒ=ZV is declining in h and m and increasing in h for`= N; S. Hence, by the implicit function theorem, and N O outsource in North, and those with productivity above N O outsource in South. This sorting pattern is similar to Antràs and Helpman (2004) , except that now the case Z S O < Z N O can also arise, in which all …rms outsource in North. Note also that in the case depicted in the …gure it is possible that all …rms will outsource in South if > N O ; otherwise the two organizational forms coexist in the industry. We now calculate the fraction of …rms that outsource in South-that is, the fraction of …rms that o¤shore-assuming the Pareto distribution of productivity (12). This fraction is given by
and (14) such that …rms with productivity < do not produce. In addition: A key implication of this proposition is that lower contractual frictions in South encourage o¤-shoring, while lower contractual frictions in North discourage o¤shoring.
Although our emphasis in this paper is on the roles played by contractual frictions, it is useful to note that two additional sectoral characteristics also a¤ect the extent of foreign sourcing: productivity dispersion and headquarter intensity. As to productivity dispersion, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that it varies substantially across sectors. We have a natural measure of dispersion, embodied in the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution; productivity dispersion is larger the smaller this parameter is. It is evident from the formula for the share of o¤shoring
, that this share is declining in . Therefore, o¤shoring is more prevalent in sectors with more productivity dispersion.
Next consider the impact of h on the extent of foreign sourcing. In Antràs and Helpman (2004) we found that o¤shoring is less prevalent in sectors with higher headquarter intensity. This is easily generalized in the current model, in which contractual frictions vary across inputs and countries.
Suppose that contractual frictions vary across inputs but not across countries, i. 
Medium Headquarter Intensity Sector
We next consider an industry with h 2 N hc ; S hc . Corollary 1 implies that in such an industry outsourcing dominates integration in South, because Z S O > Z S V , but in North integration dominates outsourcing for high-productivity …rms, because Z N V > Z N O . Figure 5 presents the pro…t functions N O and N V , which describe the tradeo¤s in the make-or-buy decision of …rms who choose to manufacture components in North; the …xed costs are higher for integration while the marginal pro…ts from higher productivity are also higher from integration. The …gure shows a cuto¤ below which …rms lose money either way, and therefore they do not produce. Firms with productivity 2 ; N O make higher pro…ts from outsourcing, and …rms with productivity above N O make higher pro…ts from integration. Naturally, if the …xed costs of integration are very low, such that N O < , then some low-productivity …rms choose not to produce and all those who produce integrate. We now focus on the case depicted in Figure 5 , in which all three organizational forms that are feasible for a headquarter intensity level of h 2 N hc ; S hc coexist, i.e., outsourcing in North, integration in North, and outsourcing in South. We wish to study the prevalence of these organizational forms. The share of …rms that outsource in South is
where is again given by (14) and
It follows that this share is larger the larger the ratio
O is increasing in S j for j = h; m, while Z N i is increasing in N j for j = h; m, i = O; V . In addition, the Zs corresponding to a particular sourcing location are not a function of the degree of contractibility in the other country. We can thus conclude that o¤shoring, which takes the form of outsourcing in our middle headquarter intensity sector, is more prevalent the better the contractual environment in South is and the worse the contractual environment in North is.
The share of …rms that outsource in North is
where
Evidently, this share does not depend on contractual frictions in South ( S m or S h ). As a result, the share of …rms that integrate in North, given by , we conclude that the share of …rms integrating in North is higher the higher the contractibility of components is in North. Interestingly, however, an improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in North, which reduces foreign o¤shoring, does not always lead to an increase in the share of …rms integrating in North. 25 We can summarize our results for the intermediate-headquarter-intensity sector as follows:
Proposition 8 Consider an industry with h 2 N hc ; S hc . Then no …rm integrates in South and there exists a cuto¤ given by (14) such that …rms with productivity < do not produce. In addition, there exist two thresholds N V and N O , de…ned by (17) and ( (ii) The fraction of o¤ shoring …rms is larger (where o¤ shoring takes the form of outsourcing) and the fraction of …rms that integrate in North is smaller the larger the fractions of contractible activities are in South. The fraction of …rms that outsource in North is not a¤ ected by contractual frictions in South.
(iii) The fraction of o¤ shoring …rms is smaller and the fraction of …rms that source in North is larger As in the low headquarter intensity sector, we …nd in this case too that o¤shoring declines with contractual frictions in South and rises with contractual frictions in North. The main di¤erence with the previous case is that the share of …rms that outsource in North is now independent of contractibility in South and it no longer unambiguously increases when contacting institutions improve in North. Evidently, these di¤erences stem from the fact that under the conditions of this proposition, o¤shoring competes with integration in North rather than with outsourcing in North. 26
High Headquarter Intensity Sector
Propositions 7 and 8 imply that in sectors with headquarter intensity h < S hc ; no foreign direct investment takes place; there can be integration in North but not in South. It follows that o¤shoring via integration can emerge only in sectors with relatively high headquarter intensity. So consider a sector with h > S hc . Corollary 1 implies that in such a sector the marginal pro…tability of integration is higher than the marginal pro…tability of outsourcing in each one of the countries, i.e., ZV > ZÒ for`= N; S. In this case all four organizational forms may coexist in equilibrium:
outsourcing in North, integration in North, outsourcing in South, and integration in South (FDI). This is illustrated in Figure 6 . outsource in South, and those with > S O integrate in South, i.e., they engage in foreign direct investment. Naturally, we can change the assumptions on …xed costs or the ranking of the marginal pro…ts Z j i to eliminate one or more of the regimes in this case too. But their ranking by productivity will not be a¤ected.
We next study the determinants of the relative prevalence of di¤erent organizational forms in an equilibrium in which all four forms coexist. Our …rst observation is that the shares of …rms that outsource in North or integrate in North are given as before by (18) and (20) (17) and (19), respectively, we conclude that the e¤ects of changes in contractibility on the shares N O and N V are identical to those in sectors with h 2 N hc ; S hc , as summarized in Proposition 8. It remains to discuss how the degree of contractibility of di¤erent inputs in di¤erent countries a¤ects the relative prevalence of …rms that outsource in South or engage in FDI there. A direct corollary of Proposition 8 is that the overall share of …rms that o¤shore, given by
is larger the larger contractibility is in South, and is lower the larger contractibility is in North.
How is the decrease in the share of …rms that o¤shore distributed between …rms that outsource and …rms that engage in FDI when contractibility improves in North? To answer this question,
where is given by (14) and
It thus follows that the share S V is larger the larger the ratio
Evidently, the share of …rms that do FDI falls as a result of increases in N j for j = N; S. Moreover, the fraction of o¤shoring …rms that do FDI is given by
which from (17) and (23) is an increasing function of
We can thus conclude that an improvement of contractibility in North increases the prevalence of FDI relative to foreign outsourcing. Given that the share of …rms engaged in FDI is negatively a¤ected by such an improvement in contractibility in North, we also conclude that the share of …rms that outsource falls. In sum, larger contractibility in North is associated with lower shares of both types of o¤shoring …rms, with the decrease falling disproportionately on …rms that outsource.
We noted above that an improvement in contracting institutions in South increases the share of …rms that o¤shore. We next want to study the e¤ects of this change on the relative prevalence of the two distinct types of o¤shoring: outsourcing and FDI. In doing so, it is important to distinguish between improvements in the contractibility of components and improvements in the contractibility of headquarter services.
Consider the former …rst. Remember that the share of …rms that do FDI, S V , is increasing in the ratio Z S V Z S O =Z N O ; which we can write as
We have established above that both Z S O and the ratio Z S V =Z S O are increasing in S m . As a result, the share of …rms that do FDI is increasing in the contractibility of components in South.
The e¤ect of S m on S O is more complicated. From (21) and (22) we obtain
A larger contractibility of components in South makes foreign outsourcing relatively more pro…table than integration in North ( = N V falls), but it also decreases the pro…tability of outsourcing in South relative to FDI ( = S O falls). The balance of these two e¤ects is in general ambiguous, and we cannot rule out that increases in S m actually reduce the share of …rms that outsource in South. Moreover, although the above discussion might have suggested that an improvement in the contractibility of components in South has a disproportionately large e¤ect on FDI relative to outsourcing, it is possible to generate numerical examples in which the ratio S V = S O is actually decreasing in S m . 27 We …nally study the e¤ects of an improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in South on the share of …rms that outsource in South and the share of …rms that engage in FDI. As noted above, the fraction of o¤shoring …rms that do FDI,
shows that it is decreasing in S h . As a result, we conclude that an improvement in the contractibility of headquarter services in South increases the share of …rms o¤shoring there, with a disproportionately positive e¤ect on the share of …rms that outsource in South. As a matter of fact, the disproportionate e¤ect may be large enough to generate a negative relationship between S h and the share of …rms that engage in FDI.
The results we obtained for the high-headquarter-intensity sector can be summarized as follows Proposition 9 Consider an industry with h > S hc . Then there exists a cuto¤ given by (14) such that …rms with productivity < do not produce. In addition, there exist three thresholds An important implication of this proposition is that a better contractual environment in South or a worse contractual environment in North do not equally encourage o¤shore outsourcing and FDI; they tend to encourage o¤shore outsourcing relatively more, except in cases in which the contractual improvement in South a¤ects disproportionately the production of components.
Concluding Comments
In this paper we have generalized the global sourcing model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) to accommodate varying degrees of contractual frictions. In the model, a continuum of …rms with heterogenous productivities decide whether to integrate or outsource intermediate inputs and in which countries to source the inputs. Final-good producers and their suppliers make relationshipspeci…c investments which are only partially contractible, both in an integrated …rm and in an arm's-length relationship. The degree of contractibility can vary across countries and inputs.
Our model generates equilibria in which …rms with di¤erent productivity levels chose di¤erent ownership structures and supplier locations. Assuming a Pareto distribution of productivity, we studied the e¤ects of changes in the quality of contractual institutions on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. We have shown that an improvement in contractual institutions in South raises the prevalence of o¤shoring, but it can reduce the relative prevalence of either FDI or o¤shore outsourcing if it a¤ects disproportionately the contractibility of headquarter services or components, respectively. This result embodies one of the major messages of the paper: the relative prevalence of alternative organizational forms depends not only on cross-country di¤erences in contractibility, but also on the degree to which contractual institutions are biased toward inputs controlled by the …nal-good producer or other suppliers.
Although our model is partial equilibrium in scope, it can be embodied in a general equilibrium framework. Such an analysis might shed light on the sources of international income di¤erences and their relationship to the structure of contractual frictions and the resulting trade and investment. This representation of the revenue is obtained by substituting (4) into (2) and the result into (1).
The …rst-order conditions (6) follow directly from this problem.
To prove Lemma 1, note from (3) and (6) that x jc > x jn if and only if
But, since `2 (0; 1) for`= h; m, the left-hand side is larger than 1 while the right-hand side is smaller than 1, implying x jc > x jn .
Using the expression for R from (A2), the …rst-order conditions (6) can be expressed as
The solution to this system of equations yields (7).
Next, from (A1) we have
Substituting (6) into this expression yields
Using (A2) together with (7) yields (8).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, …rst note from (8) that pro…ts are trivially a decreasing function of input costs and the outside option of suppliers. To show that pro…ts are decreasing in ! j , j = h; m, requires more involved arguments. For this purpose …rst note that is decreasing in ! j if and only
is decreasing in ! j . Taking logarithms of both sides and di¤erentiating, we obtain
Moreover,
Next note that
The last inequality results from the fact that ln h + 1 h is maximized at h = 1, in which case g (0)j h =1 = 0. Yet h 2 (0; 1), and therefore we have the inequality. We have thus proved that pro…ts are declining in ! h , and therefore they are rising in h (because ! h = (1 h ) h ). Symmetric arguments show that pro…ts are also declining in ! m and therefore increasing in m .
Next di¤erentiate (A3) to obtain
The previous arguments then establish that the right-hand side is strictly positive. It follows that h is strictly increasing in ! h . A symmetric argument implies that m is strictly increasing in ! m . Therefore h is strictly declining in ! m .
A.4 Determinants of the Make-or-Buy Decision and Proof of Proposition 3
To formally prove Proposition 3, we need to study the properties of the ratio Z V =Z O . From (9), we have
.
It is useful to work with the following monotonic transformation of Z V =Z O :
(1 ) ln
We will …rst prove that ln (Z V =Z O ) is an increasing function of ! h and a decreasing function of ! m . This will immediately imply that Z V =Z O is increasing in h and m and decreasing in m and h . Let us start with the e¤ect of ! m . Straightforward di¤erentiation of (25) delivers
To show that @ ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! m < 0 we will proceed in two steps. We will …rst show that @ 2 ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! 2 m < 0 and then that, when evaluated at ! = 0, @ ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! m is negative.
Step 1: Simple though cumbersome di¤erentiation delivers and thus it su¢ ces to check that g ( ; hV ; hO ; ! h ; 1) is positive. But this follows from g ( ; hV ; hO ; ! h ; 1) = (1 ) ( hV hO + 2 hO (1 ! h ) + 2 ! h (1 hV )) + (2 hV hO (1 ! h ) + hV ! h (1 hO ) + ! h hO (1 hV )) (1 ! h ) , which indeed is a sum of positive terms.
Step 2: Next we note that, when evaluated at ! m = 0, we have that @ ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! m < 0 if and only if h ( hO ) = ln 1
But note that
and thus hV = arg sup h ( hO ) (remember that hO hV is not possible). Finally, note that h ( hV ) = 0; and thus it follows that h ( hO ) < 0 and @ ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! m < 0 for all ! m 2 (0; 1).
This completes the proof that Z V =Z O is an decreasing function of ! m .
The proof of @ ln (Z V =Z O ) =@! h > 0 is analogous, though we need not repeat all the steps. It su¢ ces to note that letting^ hV = 1 hV and^ hO = 1 hO , we can write (25) Given these results we can conclude that Z V =Z O is increasing in h and m and decreasing in m . Next, we want to show that outsourcing is preferred to integration for a low enough h , while the converse is true for a high enough h . This follows from noting that when h ! 0, then ! h ! 0 and (1 ) ln
Because hV > hO , using the fact that (1 ax) x a=(1 a) is an increasing function of x for a 2 (0; 1) and x 2 (0; 1), we can conclude that This implies that Z V =Z O < 1 and thus pro…ts are higher under outsourcing in such a case (remember that …xed and variable costs are here assumed identical under integration and outsourcing).
Similarly, when h ! 1, then ! m ! 0 and
Again, using the fact that (1 ax) x a=(1 a) is an increasing function of x for a 2 (0; 1) and x 2 (0; 1), we can conclude that ln (Z V =Z O ) > 0 and pro…ts are higher under integration in such a case.
Given the monotonicity of ln (Z V =Z O ) and the two extreme cases h ! 0 and h ! 1, we can thus conclude that a unique headquarter-intensity cuto¤ hc 2 (0; 1) exists, such that pro…ts are higher under outsourcing for h < hc and higher under integration for h > hc .
To prove part (ii) of Proposition 3 it su¢ ces to use the implicit function theorem. The cuto¤ hc is implicitly de…ned by Z V =Z O = 1. Since Z V =Z O is increasing in h , decreasing in h , and increasing in m , we can conclude that the cuto¤ hc is higher the larger h is and the smaller m is.
A.5 Numerical Example in Footnote 19
Remember that the ratio Z V =Z O is given by 
